Tuesday, 4 March 2014

Crisis In The Ukraine-What President Putin Should Really Fear
                                                             (Part II)
The Ukraine, as an economic and military entity, holds little viability without the Crimea and the Eastern Provinces.
So what then will President Putin do to resolve a crisis of his (Russia's) own making?
So far all  the Russian government's responses against the democratic uprising in the West of the Ukraine have been calculated and measured.  The reason for this, from President Putin's perspective, is because Russia is holding all of the economic cards.  The wealth of The Ukraine lies in it's Eastern provinces and it's military significance in the Crimea – both of which are firmly under the Russian sphere of influence.
So what will President Putin do?
The answer is that, logically, he needs to do very little – except reinforce the Crimea and send Special Forces to secure control of the Eastern provinces from 'infiltration'.
This will involve the invoking of an emergency preparedness scenario to take effective control of key strategic and economic facilities, to arrest potential saboteurs and 'fifth columnists'. Effectively, a sleeper Russian cell, prepared for such a scenario will likely become operative to take mimic control of all infrastructural and network routes in and out of key regions.
To believe that Russia has not prepared for this or another similar situation for many decades would be very naïve.
So, as in a game of chess, the next move is up to the West, or, to be more precise, The Ukrainian Nationalists. Can they repeat a Syria scenario – where modern urban warfare, insurgency tactics and psyops are deployed in densely populated modern cities, towns and villages?
Are there enough loyal sleeper cells deployed within administrations to effectively counter the likely tactics of Russian forces – whose strategies and tactics will have been determined by Moscow and not at local levels?
How long can such a Mexican standoff last - days, weeks, years, decades?
Can Russia afford a protracted war (insurgency) or a reign of terror against the Russian populations in regions where they constitute minorities,  in The Ukraine? 
Can Russia afford the huge displacement in refugee populations and the humanitarian fallout of such displacements?  Has Russia really prepared for such a scenario - the ability to absorb internally displaced refugees in such vast numbers?
Can normal life function under effective conditions of martial law?
At the end of the day, can Russia divert it's gas and oil priorities to counterbalance any sanctions from the United States and Western Europe?
A number of developments in recent years have taken place. One from Africa and one from Transcaucasia, which guarantee that the West is not entirely dependent on Russian oil nor gas. Several years ago, I met and discussed briefly with a former U.S. Presidential Candidate (in an informal setting) the coming online of one such project.  This, together with increased supplies from allies and the current world recession, will mean the prospects of starving Western Europe and the United Kingdom of vital oil and gas, are highly remote or at least less comprehensive to achieve than, say, even 5 years ago.
President Putin has so far played this crisis like someone holding all the Aces in the deck.
Only time will tell if he has miscalculated Jokers for Aces.


Patrick Emek