Thursday, 8 October 2015

Why Russia Will Not 'Offer' To Conduct Military Operations In Iraq

(Lessons Learned From American Failures)

There is increasing speculation that the Iraqi Premier's recent statement about Russian assistance may herald Russian forces joining the campaign against ISIL/ISIS Daesh in Iraq. Such, however, is unlikely to happen.

Chasing Straws In the Wind
Why, in my opinion, it will not happen in the manner envisaged by the Iraqi Premier, is outlined below.

One of the lessons learnt from American disasters in Libya, Iraq, Syria and now even in Afghanistan (as the promised additional military assistance and resources have not been forthcoming in time to hold back the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Daesh) is that you cannot conduct a military operational campaign when it is being micromanaged by politicians. Yes of course, it is political agendas which set the framework and it is to such that the military officers are ultimately accountable.
Political paralysis in the United States has meant that a unified coherent foreign policy has been impossible to achieve – especially in the conduct of military operations in Syria.
As with Libya and Iraq in the past, such means that the Republican and Democrat Representatives have different outcome agendas and neither appear to have the expertise nor vision to provide blueprints beyond military campaigns and occupation, with very limited strategic objectives, almost oblivious to the masses (local populace) who are perceived as available for micromanagement by U.S. trained military, paramilitary and police units – something similar to what might take place in the United States to control urban civic unrest.
For example it took the brutal murder of many U.S. troops - in many instances by female suicide bombers - in Iraq - for the U.S. forces to appreciate that men do not 'frisk' Muslim women in alien (i.e. their own Muslim) lands.  Iraq, it was then appreciated, is not the United States.

The Enemy Within
In the lead up to a U.S. election year all such divided House members will pivot for maximum advantage and all demand not just being kept 'in the loop' but in micromanaging operations to such an extent that if the military commanders are perceived as not reflecting each sides public policy electorate-winning emotive agenda policies, leakages (of operational failures, cooperation with Russian forces, betrayal of U.S. 'patriotic' values) to the mass media in order to discredit political opponents will be both the order of the day – and turn any coherent unified strategy into a fiasco.

The Lone Ranger
It is for such reasons that any offer along the lines of the Iraqi Premier is a 'poisoned chalice' – even more since the White House has rejected (or spurned) any cooperation with Russia's military campaign in Syria.

The Empire Strikes Back
The only time when the Russian Federation will, in my opinion, consider assisting Iraq would occur should the Iraq government formally request assistance from the Federation – with no conditions attached which might hinder of impede Russian Allied operational issues.
Iraq is not in the same desperate situation which President Assad is.
The new regime in power does not want a return of the Ba'athist Officers who have, by and large, defected to ISIS.
The Kurdish region is heavily dependant on U.S. support whilst the Sadarists in the South dependant on Iran.
The failure, however, of the United States to offer anything other than words of sympathy for the Kurds in what is developing as an (internal) outright civil war against the Salafist-controlled government in Turkey and the paucity of the grade of weapons being supplied to their forces, notwithstanding air support against ISIL forces (to protect oilfields rather than Kurdish forces and territory per se) could well persuade the Kurds that they too have little to loose and everything to gain with a joint request for assistance to Moscow.

There is no doubt that if such a request was made and the mistakes of both Russia in Afghanistan and the United States more recently in Iraq, Libya and Syria unlikely to be repeated, under such circumstances such a joint request would be favorably considered by the Russian parliament.

The Framework Shifts
At such a stage, China, already on good terms with both Iran and the Shia political and spiritual leadership in Iraq, seeing how the export of such chaos could be motivated by external elements to destabilize its own fragile Muslim regions, may well decide, having witnessed the terrible destructive potential which this movement (ISIL) poses, that it is in its own longer-term security interest, to join the battle in Iraq against ISIL rather than having to combat these fanatics with military campaigns for decades - or even longer - in its own backyard.

If the above scenario plays out, it would no doubt be a decisive game changer.
There are, again, longer term implications of having both Russia and China as significant regional players in the region.

Check (Mate?)
Apart from Baghdad, the Iraqi State (or what is left of it) is partially surrounded by patchworks of ISIL-controlled regions – in spite of American bombing strategies and the presence of limited advisors to support Iraqi government's military initiatives, there is just not the confidence that America has the political will to 'get the job done'. There is no evidence in Washington that such a unified strategy exists – indeed quite the opposite appears to be the case in an election lead-up year where its every political party for itself – power is the name of the game.

Deja Vu
As in an earlier war which ended in a fiasco and betrayal – Vietnam – the Iraqi government, is, I have no doubt, beginning to ponder as to whether it is now nearing time to contemplate the unthinkable - jumping ship - before it, also, is too late.


[The symbolism of the launch of Russian Cruise Missiles against ISIL targets in Syria from it's fleet in the Caspian Sea, an area the U.S. and Allies intend as the next area of influence, is lost upon the general media.  Please read my earlier blogs for further clarity on this matter.]


©Patrick Emek, October 2015