Why A Breakneck-Speed Referendum in The Crimea For
Secession and Unification with Russia?
1revised March 10. 2014
2
revised March 11, 2014
3updated March 13,2014
Constitutionally the Crimean
Parliament does not have the right to secede from The Ukraine without
1.Approval of The Ukrainian
Parliament in Kiev
2.A National Referendum
conducted by Parliament in Kiev throughout the whole country of The
Ukraine
3.Further Parliamentary
approval (ratification) from Kiev following the results (if approved
by the majority of the voting Ukrainian population) of such a
National Referendum
So why the
Crimea Horse-Race Vote at Breakneck Speed?
It's very simple. Legally,
there is no elected government in Kiev.
Whatever your view of the
Democratic Spring Revolution, the Ukrainian people have not yet voted
on a new government for the Republic of The Ukraine.
All of it's politicians in
power in Kiev do not owe their position to a national election, vote
or ballot, as we recognize civic society as existing, in Western
Europe.
It is often acceptable that
interim leaderships can function in the event of national crises and
it is as such that the Ukrainian Parliament is currently functioning.
It is to pip this National
Ukrainian Election and a Referendum vote on secession to the post that a race is on to
cobble together a local referendum in The Crimea while it is still
possible to say that the former President and his government were the
last legitimate government representing all of the Ukrainian people
so there is no legitimate government to negotiate with. Such will be
impossible to justify after the Parliament in Kiev has set it's own
date for a national election to democratically elect the new
post-Russian-dominated Parliament – as it is almost for sure that a
free and fair election will confirm the new democrats in Kiev and
seal their legitimate administration of the country as a whole. So it
is to prevent this, that The Crimea, as a matter of urgency, is
seeking to have it's own illegal referendum on secession. It
knows it cannot win a National Referendum but for sure will win this
local vote to secede and unite with Russia. The situation will become
even more precarious if the Eastern Provinces and two other regions in the South
also declare formulations to have their similar referendums on the
same issue. Such would certainly push the country of The Ukraine from
a crisis to the brink of an economic abyss, the likes of which has
never been seen in any part of Europe to date.
Whether President Putin will
take such a dangerous gamble with the peace and security of
continental Europe it is unclear at present.
The likely scenario is that
the Eastern provinces will be firmly secured under Moscow's indirect
control but no additional referendums will be promoted. This will
leave the door open for diplomacy when a new democratically elected
Ukrainian Government (which will have the unanimous backing of the
international community - The United States,The United Kingdom, The
European Union,The African Union, and most of the OAS - other than,of
course, Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia and possibly 2 other South American
Countries. The position of Brazil is unclear but should it decide to vote against Ukrainian democracy after national elections, it would come as no great surprise - being itself the foremost Apartheid State in South America where over 75% of it's population is equally disenfranchised from all political and economic power. It might similarly see Ukrainian popular democracy as setting a very dangerous precedent the likes of which, one day, itself, it will most certainly also face.)
The position of the new government in Chile on the matter of support for the Ukrainian popular uprising against Russian domination is likewise unclear at present. Should it decide to oppose (or indeed abstain from) recognition of the new Ukrainian democrats after national elections, and other South American nations follow suit, this will indicate a very significant shift in South American foreign perspectives and policy for a significant number of the most important countries in this region.
The position of Argentina on recognition is very complicated. It might, for reasons of political expediency and the (historically profound) changing relationships between South American nations and the United States, be eager to give support to the Crimea but (in the eyes of Buenos Aires) the unresolved status of the Falkland Islands (a group of remote island off it's coast, 99% of whose population wants to remain part of the United Kingdom and retain links with the British Commonwealth) may determine otherwise. With the support of Britain, during the administration years of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, The Falkland Islands successfully resisted a military invasion and attempted take over by the Argentinian Military Junta. These recent historical facts may very well determine a vote in support of the new democrats in Kiev and sovereign unity of the The Ukraine as a whole.1 Bolivia will most likely vote against recognition of the new democrats in Kiev1 .
Likewise the ACS (Association of Caribbean States),The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations) and The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Member States ( with the exception of Iran and Syria) will most certainly recognize the new government in Kiev, after democratic elections.
The position of Israel is also quite complicated. In an ideal world it's preference would be either to abstain - or even vote to support Russia on this particular issue. What is likely to happen however is that Israel will vote in support of it's strategic ally, the United States, thus in favor of the new democrats in Kiev, after general elections.
That being said, the joint security interests of Israel and Russia and the Russian Federation will henceforth be given higher priority in an area where the potential for the transfer of nuclear technology know-how to Islamic extremists in such an unstable region could have disastrous consequences for all concerned2 .
China most certainly and, surprisingly, India might also possibly vote to support The Russian Federation against the legitimacy and recognition of the new Ukrainian Government in the aftermath of a national election. [Lets be clear about China. A vote by China to abstain from voting, is, in this instance, in effect, a vote in favor of Russia.3 ]
Should India vote to support Russia, this can most certainly be seen as direct 'fallout' from the Khobragade Incident - where an accredited Indian United Nations Diplomat was arrested, forcibly strip-searched and (internal cavity) bodily searched before being deported from the United States. This was an insult to India's national pride - which most U.S . politicians either do not understand or simply do not care about to this day.
The position of the new government in Chile on the matter of support for the Ukrainian popular uprising against Russian domination is likewise unclear at present. Should it decide to oppose (or indeed abstain from) recognition of the new Ukrainian democrats after national elections, and other South American nations follow suit, this will indicate a very significant shift in South American foreign perspectives and policy for a significant number of the most important countries in this region.
The position of Argentina on recognition is very complicated. It might, for reasons of political expediency and the (historically profound) changing relationships between South American nations and the United States, be eager to give support to the Crimea but (in the eyes of Buenos Aires) the unresolved status of the Falkland Islands (a group of remote island off it's coast, 99% of whose population wants to remain part of the United Kingdom and retain links with the British Commonwealth) may determine otherwise. With the support of Britain, during the administration years of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, The Falkland Islands successfully resisted a military invasion and attempted take over by the Argentinian Military Junta. These recent historical facts may very well determine a vote in support of the new democrats in Kiev and sovereign unity of the The Ukraine as a whole.1 Bolivia will most likely vote against recognition of the new democrats in Kiev1 .
Likewise the ACS (Association of Caribbean States),The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations) and The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Member States ( with the exception of Iran and Syria) will most certainly recognize the new government in Kiev, after democratic elections.
The position of Israel is also quite complicated. In an ideal world it's preference would be either to abstain - or even vote to support Russia on this particular issue. What is likely to happen however is that Israel will vote in support of it's strategic ally, the United States, thus in favor of the new democrats in Kiev, after general elections.
That being said, the joint security interests of Israel and Russia and the Russian Federation will henceforth be given higher priority in an area where the potential for the transfer of nuclear technology know-how to Islamic extremists in such an unstable region could have disastrous consequences for all concerned2 .
China most certainly and, surprisingly, India might also possibly vote to support The Russian Federation against the legitimacy and recognition of the new Ukrainian Government in the aftermath of a national election. [Lets be clear about China. A vote by China to abstain from voting, is, in this instance, in effect, a vote in favor of Russia.3 ]
Should India vote to support Russia, this can most certainly be seen as direct 'fallout' from the Khobragade Incident - where an accredited Indian United Nations Diplomat was arrested, forcibly strip-searched and (internal cavity) bodily searched before being deported from the United States. This was an insult to India's national pride - which most U.S . politicians either do not understand or simply do not care about to this day.
Patrick Emek
1revised March 10. 2014
2
revised March 11, 2014
3updated March 13,2014
