The
looming biological warfare storm:
Misconceptions and
probable scenarios
Spring, 2003
by Col (Dr) Jim A. Davis
''......Yet, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one... Many have chemical and biological weapons. Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world 's least-responsible states.''
President George W. Bush, National Defense University, 1 May 2001
THE LIKELIHOOD THAT biological weapons will be used against our nation continues to rise. Many in the recent past have considered the talk of such horrific weapons as only hype to justify funding for certain programs for DOD, other governmental agencies, or government contractors. The stark reality of 11 September 2001-when hijacked airliners were used as missiles, and anthrax attacks followed--has changed that perception for many. However, since we have not yet suffered a mass-casualty biological warfare (BW) event, there are others that still dismiss the scenario as highly unlikely.
If this view is persuasive to US decision makers, it will impede the nation's ability to prepare for or prevent such an event. Until very recently, the lack of focus on this subject had resulted in a lack of appropriate funding and accountability. There are six important myths that have caused some senior civilian and military government leaders to develop an inappropriate view of this threat.
It would be valuable to those who recognize the nation's vulnerability to BW to know the most likely scenarios we should expect to encounter. Such informed speculations and visualization allow us to prepare before the event or possibly even to prevent it. This article describes six common myths about BW and three of the most likely future BW scenarios we may face.
Why Postulate?
Thomas C. Schelling observes that "the tendency in our planning is to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously." (1)
The United States has limited funds to spend on social and military programs. The military budget is currently 3 percent of the US gross national product (GNP) as compared to 6 percent of the GNP during the late 1980s. (2) The most devastating terrorist attack ever perpetrated against the United States occurred on 11 September 2001 and not only cost many lives, but the associated economic impact exceeded hundreds of billions of dollars in direct replacement costs, lost revenues, and costly response efforts. Yet, the human impact and economic impact of 11 September 2001 will be dwarfed if adversaries are able to effectively deploy mass-casualty biological weapons against the United States. Unless we focus appropriate dollars and develop a coherent national plan to prepare for and prevent such actions, the United States will likely suffer an enormous economic loss that could even lead to our demise as a superpower.
Will There Really Be an Attack?
A belief in one or more of at least six false assumptions or myths helps explain why individuals, including senior civilian and military leaders, do not believe that a mass-casualty BW attack will occur.
Myth One: There never really has been a significant BW Attack
This contention is counter to historical fact. Even before the fall 2001 anthrax terrorism in the United States, incidents of BW and bio-terrorism have occurred on multiple occasions. Today, more countries have active BW programs than at any other time in history, which increases the likelihood that BW will be used again in the future.
Military organizations have used biological weapons many times. One BW event occurred in 1346 when the Mongols used plague (Yersinia pest is) at the Battle of Kaffa. More recently, during the French and Indian War, the British used smallpox (Variola) against the Delaware Indians and also are alleged to have used smallpox against Gen George Washington's forces during the Revolutionary War. (3) The Germans used anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) and glanders (Pseudomonas mallei) against the horses and mules of the US Army and its Allies in World War I. The Japanese used typhoid (Salmonella typhi) in World War II in direct attacks on approaching Russian forces. (4) They also used over 16 different BW agents (plague, anthrax, etc) on Chinese forces and citizens, US prisoners of wax; British detainees, and others. Ken Alibek, former head of the civilian branch of the Soviet offensive biological program, has unearthed information that leads him to believe that the Soviet army may have used tularemia (Francisella tularensis) to halt the oncoming German army in World War II. (5) The Textbook for Military Medicine, published in 1997, states that an estimated 10,923 deaths resulted from the Soviet use of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea (Cambodia). (6) In 2001, the US Senate and other US government offices were attacked through the mail system by letters filled with lethal anthrax spores milled to the 1--5 micron size, which can inflict death from inhalation. BW, it must be concluded, has been an accepted practice for a number of states for a long time.
Myth Two: The United States has never been attacked by a BW Agent
Counting the 2001 anthrax attacks, there are at least six known instances where BW has been used against US citizens or resources. The British were alleged to have used smallpox in the Revolutionary War. The Germans used glanders against US horses and mules during World War I. The Japanese used multiple biological agents against their foes during World War II. The Aum Shinrikyo cult failed in 1990 in its botulinum toxin attack on the two US naval bases located at Yokosuka and Yokohama. (7) In 1984, the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh cult contaminated 10 restaurant salad bars in Oregon with salmonella and infected at least 750 local citizens. (8) This BW attack, like the naval base attacks, was not discovered until several years after the event. Proliferation experts, such as the National Defense University's Seth Carus, agree that these examples lend credence to the possibility that the United States may have unknowingly fallen victim to still other BW attacks in the past. (9)
Myth Three: You have to be extremely intelligent, highly educated, and well funded to grow, weaponize, and deploy a BW Agent
Financial status or brilliance is no longer a major roadblock for an individual or group to acquire a significant BW capability. Dr. Tara O'Toole, deputy director for the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at Johns Hopkins University, believes we have probably crossed over the threshold from "too difficult" to accomplish to "doable by a determined individual or group." (10) It is true that there are certain technical hurdles, but there are many thousands of highly educated microbiologists or other health science professionals worldwide that are capable of growing, weaponizing, and employing a BW agent. Much of the technical information is readily available on the Internet, in libraries, and through mail-order channels that provide "how-to" manuals. For example, Steve Priesler, who has a degree in chemistry, wrote such a manual and made it available on the Internet for only $18. (11) This manual, titled Silent Death by "Uncle Fester," tells the reader where to find, grow, and weaponize agents such as Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum; it also instructs the reader on how to employ the agents to kill small or large numbers of people.
Myth Four: Biological Warfare must be too difficult because it has failed when it has been tried
Most of the BW attempts mentioned in this article resulted in deaths or casualties. However, not all attempts in the past have been successful. For example, it was not known until 1995 (when several of its incarcerated leaders confessed) that in 1990 the Aum Shinrikyo cult had sprayed two US naval bases in Japan. It is not known why their attack failed, but there were thousands of US sailors and dependants who were one breath away from dying had the Aum Shinrikyo cult been a bit more skilled. While this cult may have failed to master the technological hurdles, several nations had learned a great deal about how to make and effectively use these weapons over half a century earlier. The Japanese began their BW program in the early 1930s and used it against their opponents in World War II. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union also started BW programs during the 1930s and 1940s. Basic BW technology has been around for 60 years, and all of these countries were to develop large and potent BW programs. This was long before the era of genetic engineering and the mapping of genomes. Although some of the BW program secrets were probably not available to the Aum Shinrikyo cult, the 1990s brought a proliferation of information and biotechnological advances. (12) In light of all the previously successful attacks, it is a weak argument to say that BW "has not been successful," based only on the Aum Shinrikyo's inability to kill Americans with botulinum toxin or its failed attempts to kill Japanese with anthrax. (13) In the twenty-first century, technological barriers are no longer as formidable as they once were, and some experts believe that a determined individual or group can independently develop BW mass-casualty weapons. (14)
Myth Five: There are moral restraints that have kept and will keep BW Agents from being used
Most states in the twentieth century have generally avoided the use of BW agents. For example, the United States had an offensive BW program from 1942 to 1969, but it never used BW agents. The Soviets had enough BW agents weaponized to kill the world several times over and yet exhibited restraint. It may be that the various political, military, and moral constraints against BW use have thus far prevented BW on a mass scale, but it appears that we are now entering a new era. Jessica Stern, in The Ultimate Terrorists, outlines four techniques of "moral disengagement" that individuals and groups have used to justify their use of mass-casualty weapons. (15)
The following examples illustrate the lack of moral inhibition by various types of terrorism. On 26 February 1993, terrorist Ramzi Yousef and several other Muslim terrorists exploded a bomb intended to topple the World Trade Center twin towers and kill at least 250,000 people. (16) The blast, although not completely successful, killed six, injured more than 1,000, and inflicted costs in excess of $600,000,000. (17) On 19 April 1995, Timothy McVeigh committed the worst act of domestic terrorism by an American citizen when he bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. (18) More than 550 people were targeted, and the resulting tragedy left 168 dead and hundreds of others wounded. (19) On 11 September 2001, international terrorists destroyed the twin towers of the World Trade Center, ruined over 20 adjacent buildings, and significantly damaged the Pentagon by hijacking and crashing US commercial airliners into these icons of American society. In less than two short hours, these brutal acts of terror killed approximately 3,000 innocent civilians and military personnel while injuring many thousands more and bringing US air travel to a temporary and very costly halt. (20)
We can look to the emergence of organizations such as al Qaida, Osama bin Laden's group, and see that any previous moral constraints to inflicting massive civilian deaths are no longer applicable. They have launched a "holy war" against the United States and are not reticent to inflict heavy casualties on US citizens--even if it entails the loss of their own lives. In fact, according to the holy war paradigm propagated by Bin Laden, great honor is supposed to accrue to those who die killing many "infidels." Thus, "morality" can be marshaled as a reason both to limit BW use and to advocate mass killings--depending on the decision maker's values and perspectives.
Myth Six The long incubation period required for BW Agents before onset of symptoms makes BW useless to users
There have already been multiple BW attacks, and to a savvy biological weaponeer, the incubation period can be used as an advantage rather than a disadvantage. The two following scenarios illustrate that advantage. In the first scenario, an anthrax attack is made on an adversary's military installation. That attack could render the installation nonfunctional within 72 hours. The first clinical cases of anthrax would probably manifest themselves in around 24 hours, with the number of subsequent cases increasing rapidly. A follow-on conventional military attack that was timed to occur three to four days after the BW attack would likely find the installation defenders laid low by the disease and therefore would be more likely to succeed. Moreover, because of the nature of the Bacillus anthracis organism, the attackers would not have to be overly concerned about significant secondary infections from their infected adversaries or by large amounts of residual spores in the environment.
The second scenario involves an attack on an adversary's population or military installation with Q fever (Coxiella burnetii). With Q fever's two- to 10-day incubation period, the attacker and his followers would have days to escape before their adversary would recognize that there had been an attack. Between the fifth and 10th day after the attack, the attackers could announce that a nonlethal weapon had been used as a "show of force and resolve" and demand whatever concessions they were after. The attackers would have little concern of being exposed to secondary infection because Q fever is not communicable. Likewise, the low fatality rate would take away the adversary's justification for a massive retaliation but at the same time leave the adversary's population with a heightened sense of fear because of their proven vulnerability.
What would motivate a BW Attack on the United States?
There are two primary motivations that might drive an adversary to attack the United States with a BW agent. Either one is enough to cause a nation, organization, or individual to act against the United States, but concerns should be particularly heightened when both of these motivations intersect.
The first motivation is to gradually "erode US influence" as a world superpower. Adversaries such as Iraq, Iran, or the al Qaida organization desire more influence in their region. They are infuriated that American infidels have increased their presence in the Middle East from three ships in 1949 to over 200,000 US military personnel in 2001. (21)
Likewise, there are other emerging economic powers in the world that see the United States in a love/hate relationship. They realize the United States is helping them to become economically sound, but they would ultimately like to take a piece of the economic action from the United States. These nations might also want to inflict damage to the US economy, and in their mind, level the playing field in a way that would minimize damage to their own economy. The far-right wing of groups with this motivation include religious terrorist groups such Osama bin Laden's al Qaida who declare that they have a religious obligation to destroy the "evil race" in the name of "Allah."
The second motivation is categorized as ''revenge or hate." At a time when the United States is an integral part of stimulating the global economy and thereby improving the standard of living for millions in the world, the so-called transparency of the United States inflames envy, which often leads to hatred, in millions around the world. The United States has 5 percent of the world's population yet uses 24 percent of the global energy. (22) The extravagance of the United States is seen by some as the reason for a worldwide moral decay. Often these same individuals may want to inflict revenge because of what they perceive the United States or its "puppet nations" have done to them individually, their family, or their group. Many of these individuals have been taught from childhood to hate the United States. This prejudice often grows as they see images on television that portray the United States as a drunken, immoral, gluttonous, and violent society.
There is synergism when a nation, group, or individual desires to erode US influence as a world superpower and is also full of revenge and hate. This effect would amplify their desire and ability to enlist support financially and deliver an effective BW attack. They then have a cause where emotion reinforces or even overrides the logic or illogic of such an attack.
* A bioterrorist attack against a large population center in the United States or an allied state.
Scenario One: An Agroterrorist event
Anne Kohnen states that "agricultural targets are soft targets,' or ones that maintain such a low level of security that a terrorist could carry out an attack unobserved. Biological agents are small, inexpensive, and nearly impossible to detect. A terrorist may choose to use BW against agriculture simply because it is the easiest and cheapest way to cause large-scale damage." (23)
As was articulated by Mark Wheelis, a senior microbiologist at the University of California, Davis, many of the moral constraints that might inhibit an adversary can be overcome by using agroterrorism. (24) The US economy could be made chaotic by inflicting damage to the US agricultural industry with three to five BW agents over a few years. For example, the United Kingdom suffered a severe disruption in day-to-day life in 2001 when foot-and-mouth disease broke out, forcing the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of livestock. Estimated cleanup and economic loss is assumed to have reached $30 to $60 billion. (25) Belgium suffered an apparent agroterrorist event when dioxin was discovered in chicken feed. (26) This resulted in boycotts across Europe and Asia of Belgian meat products that cost their economy nearly $1 billion. (27) Such an incident in the United States could potentially jeopardize $140 billion in yearly pork, beef, and poultry exports. (28) Table 1 was developed to show the status of some of the offensive agricultural BW capabilities developed or maintained by certain nations.
This type of attack has an added benefit for the adversary: unless he desires otherwise, he may never be identified. Since the goal is not to achieve attention, but to promote the demise of and inflict pain on the United States, the perpetrators could maintain a safe distance and enjoy the daily news of turmoil in the United States. They could watch the successful completion of their plan as the contagious nature of their weapon operated on its own--the gift that keeps on giving. Perpetrators willing to use this style of BW attack(s) would have to recognize that it might take years to achieve their objective. Some world terrorists may be willing to wait and see their strategic plans carried out over this longer period of time.
Scenario Two: A BW Attack on forces in the Middle East
This attack's goal is to have the United States withdraw its military forces from the region and possibly reduce its aid to allies like Israel. The Middle East contains more states with biological weapons than any other region of the world. According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, there are 11 states with suspected or confirmed offensive biological programs. Of these, six reside in the Middle East. (29) Additionally, more weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks have occurred in the Middle East than in any other region. Although most of the examples in table 2 are chemical warfare (CW) and not CBW, use clearly indicates that this region of the world has an entirely different view about the use of weapons considered taboo by much of the rest of the world. Table 2 shows some regional highlights.
So how would a BW attack be carried out in the Middle East? There are multiple options an adversary might choose to pressure the United States to withdraw from the region. The three options discussed below are illustrative of the variety of problems those attacks could create.
An adversary might choose to use a nonlethal BW agent, perhaps VEE (Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis), on a US installation. Such an attack would make personnel sick and incapacitated, but would not kill them. It could be used to demonstrate an adversary's capability, resolve, and even compassion. The adversary could allow time to ensure that the attack was effective, that deaths were minimal, that people were recovering, and then announce why and what he had done. If the BW attack failed, then the adversary would not make an announcement or lose credibility. Likewise, if the attack caused many unexpected deaths, he could merely remain quiet and potentially avoid US retaliation.
With a successful attack, the adversary's announcement of responsibility could include a stated abhorrence to killing. He could announce that while he has lethal BW agents, he had elected not to kill the sons and daughters of the United States, because he only wants the US forces out of the region--killing would only be used as a last resort.
This approach would likely trigger great debates in Washington, D.C., and Middle Eastern countries, and might even cause the US Congress to pressure the president to withdraw US forces. If the United States then elected to stay in the region and a lethal attack did occur, local populations around US bases would die along with the targeted Americans. Thereafter, local governments would be under enormous pressure and might choose to ask the United States to withdraw rather than suffer additional BW attacks on their populations.
Another option an adversary might choose would be to release a lethal agent just outside a US base so that the wind would carry it away from the base. A desirable effect could be achieved by even a small attack aimed at killing as few as 20 to 50 of the local population. The downwind casualties would be blamed on the Americans, creating a local mistrust of the American government. The responsible group would never claim credit but would inform, the media and others that the deaths were caused by US BW agents (even though the United States does not have any offensive BW agents). It's likely that the regional media would have a "heyday," which would lead to a groundswell of anger against the United States. Another similar attack could be launched after several months if the United States had not elected to significantly downsize its presence in the region. Again, the United States would be blamed, and locals might evacuate areas close to US installations. A continued US presence in the region could become politically impossible to maintain. Such small-scale attacks could be repeated over and over with lethal or nonlethal BW agents.
An adversary could also use a lethal agent directly against a US installation in the region. The adversary would never claim credit for this attack option, but might release a small dose of BW agent like anthrax or tularemia to try to kill two to 10 Americans. These deaths could raise fear of future lethal attacks and cause US officials and members of Congress to debate the merit of a continued US presence in the Middle East. In a response similar to the last option, the host government might become uncomfortable with a US presence if a few of its local citizens also died. A single attack might not cause the United States to "tuck tail and run," but if repeated often enough, the United States might reconsider and remove its forces from harm's way.
Scenario Three: A Bioterorist Attack on a large US or allied n center
The American public learned to fear anthrax after letters containing the substance had been sent via the US Postal Service to senators and various news agencies shortly after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The resultant deaths and the discovery that some al Qaida terrorists had explored renting crop dusters caused the US government to temporarily ground these important agricultural aircraft. The news media, in turn, informed the public that biological attacks were possible.
Similar to the 11 September attacks, a BW attack might be a coordinated attack and take place in several major US cities. Anthrax would probably be the agent of choice in a mass-casualty attempt since it is not contagious and the perpetrators would not have to worry about the disease getting back to their country. Five 100-pound bags of anthrax could easily be smuggled into the United States using one of the many shipments of grain that arrive at US ports every day. These bags could be made to blend in with the shipment and lined with plastic so that no powder would be prematurely released. Three to five major cities, on the order of Houston or Los Angeles, could be targeted and would require only a 100-pound bag each. An appropriate aerosolizing device, easily procured in the United States, could be mounted on an automobile, airplane, or boat. The terrorists that perpetrate this attack would not have to die because they could be vaccinated and treated with antibiotics prior to delivering the agents, which would protect them even if they were exposed. They could also easily depart the country before the first symptoms appeared and defeat the ability of federal authorities to respond and arrest them.
Hundreds of thousands of American citizens could potentially become infected and die if the agent were correctly manufactured and employed and if optimal climatic conditions were present during the attack. Such a mass-casualty attack would overwhelm the US medical system and a human, economic, and political catastrophe would result.
Summary
Many of our national leaders still do not believe that a mass-casualty BW event will happen in the next 10 years--in spite of our experience with the anthrax attacks that followed the 11 September 2001 attacks. This view is based on their belief in one of the several myths discussed in this article. Such myths continue to inhibit the adequate funding of US and allied biodefense.
US national security leaders must appreciate the urgency to refocus programs and develop appropriate budgets to support a concerted biodefense effort to counter BW possibilities. The counteragroterrorism effort is woefully underfunded. This program is of extreme importance, and it needs billions of additional dollars to upgrade the protection of our agricultural industry.
United States military forces in the Middle East must be well prepared for a BW attack, but all countries in the region have a long way to go before their biodefense equipment and tactics are adequate for the threat. US Central Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have an aggressive cooperative defense initiative (CDI) with allies and friends in the region designed to overcome the threat of WMD. Huge steps forward have already been made in preparation for a BW attack, but there is still much work ahead. While detection capabilities in the region have improved, lab results still require several hours, and these are limited to just a few of the possible BW agents. Only US installations have detection capabilities in place, and there are none in the local areas. Although there is a correct emphasis on ballistic missiles within the CDI, the biocruise missiles threat, described by Kiziali in his Assessment of the Emerging Biocruise Threat, may be an even more likely threat and should be addressed wit h an equal effort. (30)
One of the most horrifying possibilities would be a coordinated and simultaneous BW attack against several major cities in the United States and in allied countries. Those attacks could occur today, and we might not become aware of them for days. A series of major exercises have documented the likely and frightening results; many hundreds of thousands could die, and US and allied societies could be thrown into chaos and panic.
Myths to the contrary, the biological warfare and bioterrorist threats are real and require the full commitment of the United States and its allies to have a well-funded biodefense effort to produce an effective defense. The United States must take up the yoke of preventing such attacks and prepare for consequence management--managing the aftermath of such attacks--with the same vigor our nation used during the cold war. Otherwise, our national security stands in jeopardy.
--------------------------------------------------------- Table 1 States with Past and Present Agricultural BW Capabilities --------------------------------------------------------- STATE STATUS DATES Canada Former 1941-60s Egypt Probable 1972-present France Former 1939-72 Germany Former 1915-17, 1942-45 Iraq Known 1980s-present Japan Former 1937-45 North Korea Probable ? - present Rhodesia Uncertain/ 1978-80 (Zimbabwe) Former South Africa Former 1980s-93 United Former 1937-60s Kingdom United States Former 1943-69 USSR Formerly 1935-92 (Russia, active; Kazakhstan, current Uzbekistan) status unclear STATE DISEASE --------------------------------------------------------- Canada Anthrax, Rinderpest Egypt Anthrax, Brucellosis, Glanders, Psittacosis, Eastern Equine Encephalitis France Potato Beetle, Rinderpest Germany Anthrax, Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Glanders, Potato Beetle, Wheat Fungus Iraq Aflatoxin, Anthrax, Camelpox, Foot- and-Mouth Disease, Wheat Stem Rust (Camelpox may have been surrogate for Smallpox) Japan Anthrax, Glanders North Korea Anthrax Rhodesia Anthrax (Zimbabwe) South Africa Anthrax United Anthrax Kingdom United States Anthrax, Brucellosis, Eastern and Western Equine Encephalitis, Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Fowl Plague, Glanders, Late Blight of Potato, Newcastle Disease, Psittacosis, Rice Blast, Rice Brown Spot Disease, Rinderpest, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, Wheat Blast Fungus, Wheat Stem Rust USSR African Swine Fever, Anthrax, (Russia, Avian Influenza, Brown Grass Kazakhstan, Mosaic, Brucellosis, Contagious Uzbekistan) Bovine Pleuropneumonia, Contagious Ecthyma (sheep), Foot- and-Mouth Disease, Glanders, Maize Rust, Newcastle Disease, Potato Virus, Psittacosis, Rice Blast, Rinderpest, Rye Blast, Tobacco Mosaic, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, Vesicular Stomatitis, Wheat and Barley Mosaic Streak, Wheat Stem Rust, parasitic insects, and insect attractants STATE COMMENTS --------------------------------------------------------- Canada Exact date of project termination unclear. Egypt (none) France Exact date of project termination unclear. Germany In World War II experimented with Turnip Weevils, Antler Moths, Potato Stalk Rot/Tuber Decay, and misc. anticrop weeds. Iraq Believed to retain program elements despite UN disarmament efforts. Japan During World War II experimented with misc. anticrop fungi, bacteria, nematodes. North Korea (none) Rhodesia Suspicious epidemic of (Zimbabwe) cattle anthrax resulted in 182 human deaths. Some scientists believe government forces infected livestock to impoverish rural blacks during last phase of civil war. South Africa (none) United Exact date of project termi- Kingdom nation unclear. United States (none) USSR (none) (Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) Source: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Agro-terrorism: Agriculture Biowarfare: State Programs to Develop Offensive Capabilities, created October 2000, on-line, Internet, 25 January 2003, available from http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/agprogs.htm. (Chart edited for space considerations; see complete chart and extensive footnotes on Web page) Table 2 Examples of CBW Uses in the Middle East --------------------------------------- Specific Date Country CB Agent 1917 Iraq glanders 1920-30 Morocco mustard 1930 Libya mustard 1935-36 Ethiopia mustard, tear gas, various other agents 1930s Kurdistan lung irritants 1944 Israel/ unknown Palestine 1957 Oman BW 1963-67 Yemen mustard, phosgene, tear gas, possibly nerve gas 1965 Iraq unknown 1984-88 Iran/Iraq sarin, tabun, sulfur, mustard 1987 Chad unknown 1988 Iraq hydrogen cyanide, mustard, sarin, tabun 1990 Sudan mustard 1997 Jordan toxic gas Date Description ------------------------------------------------ 1917 In 1917, German agents infected over 4,500 British pack animals in Mesopotamia. 1920-30 Spain employed mustard shells and bombs against the Riff tribes. 1930 Italy dropped 24 mustard gas bombs on an oasis fighting Libyan rebels. 1935-36 Benito Mussolini authorized the use of chemical weapons on 16 Dec 1935, with the first attack on 23 Dec, when Italian air force planes sprayed mustard gas and dropped bombs filled with mustard agent on Ethiopian soldiers and civilians. Italian forces repeatedly attacked Ethiopian soldiers and civilians with mustard gas and used tear gas, sneezing gas, and various asphyxiating agents. A letter from the Ethiopian delegate to the League of Nations, dated 13 Apr 1936, alleges Italy made 20 "poison gas attacks," with mustard gas being used frequently. 1930s Soviet Union was accused of using lung irritants against Kurdistan tribesmen. 1944 Plot by the grand mufti of Jerusalem and Germans to poison wells in Tel Aviv. Ten containers were discovered with enough poison to kill 10,000 people. 1957 Britain was accused of using biological warfare agents in Oman. 1963-67 Egypt employed chemical weapons against royalist forces in the Yemen civil war. Egypt used Soviet-built aerial bombs to deliver phosgene and aerial bombs as well as artillery shells abandoned by British forces after World War I to deliver mustard gas. According to chemical weapons expert Milton Leitenberg, some of the nerve agent reportedly used by Egyptian forces may actually have consisted of hand grenades fitted with containers of organophosphate pesticides. This incident is sometimes referred to as the first use of nerve gases, but according to some reports, this is unsubstantiated. 1965 In May 1965 at a press conference in London, a spokesman for the Kurdish Democratic Party stated that on at least two occasions during the previous six weeks the Iraqi army had used gas against Kurdish forces. 1984-88 During the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, Iraq repeatedly attacked Iranian troops with chemical warfare agents. The first allegation of Iraqi CW attacks was in Nov 1980. In Nov 1983, Iran made its first official complaint to the UN regarding Iraqi CW attacks. Iraq was confirmed to have used mustard/nerve agents against Iranian forces from 1983 to 1988. Iran is believed to have conducted initial CW attacks by firing Iraqi CW munitions at Iraqi forces in 1984 or 1985. By the end of the war, Iran reportedly employed domestically produced CW munitions against Iraqi soldiers. First-ever use of tabun (nerve agent) on the battlefield was by Iraq in 1984. 1987 Libya reportedly used Iranian- supplied chemical weapons against Chad troops. 1988 Iraqi warplanes attacked the Kurdish city of Halabja, Iraq with mustard and nerve agents, killing up to 5,000 people, mostly civilians. (Following Iraqi mustard gas attacks on Halabja, fleeing Kurds may have been mistaken for Iraqi troops and bombarded with hydrogen cyanide [AC] artillery shells by Iranian forces) 1990 President Omar al-Bashir's Sudanese government had been accused of producing CW with Iranian and/or Iraqi assistance. The government was accused of initiating several mustard gas attacks on civilians and Sudanese People's Liberation Army forces in the Nuba mountain region. The allegations were not independently confirmed. 1997 Israeli agents used toxic gas in assassination attempt on a Hamas official in Amman. Source: Unclassified research at the USAF Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 2001. ---------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
(1) Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), vii.
(2) Anthony H. Cordesman, Trends in US Military Forces and Defense Spending; Peace Dividend or Underfunding? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 July 1999), 4, on-line, Internet, 11 September 2001, available from http://www.csis.org.
(3) James E. Gibson, Dr. Bodo Otto and the Medical Background of the American Revolution (Baltimore, Md.: George Banta Publishing Company, 1937), 88-89; and Jonathan B. Tucker, Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox (New York Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001), 18-22.
(4) Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-up (New York: Routledge, 1994), 74-76.
(5) Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999), 29-31.
(6) Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafuji, and David R. Franz, eds., Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of the surgeon General, US Army. 1997), 656.
(7) W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Center for Counterproliferation Research, 1998), 58; Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 63; and Dean A. Wilkening, "BCW in Attack Scenarios," in The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), 91-93.
(8) W. Seth Carus, "The Rajneeshees (1984)," in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), 115-37.
(9) David E. Kaplan, "Terrorism's Next Wave, Nerve Gas and Germs Are the New Weapons of Choice," U.S. News and World Report, 17 November 1997, on-line, Internet, 17 November 1997, available fromhttp://www.infowar.com/CLASS_3/class3_112897b.html-ssi.
(10) Dr. Tara O'Toole, "Medical and Public Health Aspects of Bioterrorism," presentation, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., 25 June 2001.
(11) Uncle Fester, Silent Death, 2d ed. (Unknown, Uncle Fester, 1997), available for sale on Internet only, on-line, Internet, 25 January 2003, available from http://www.crbbooks.com/catalog_2_item_n1/uncle-silent.htm.
(12) O'Toole; Michael T. Osterholm and John Schwartz, Living Terrors: What America Needs to Know to Survive the Coming Bioterrorist Catastrophe (New York: Random House, Inc., 2000), 37-39; and Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 316.
(13) Wilkening, 91-93; and David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996), 1-283.
(14) O'Toole; Osterholm, 37-39; and Miller, 316.
(15) Stern, 81-83.
(16) Simon Reeve, The New Jackals; Ramzi Yonsef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism (Boston, Mass.: Northeastern University Press, 1999), 24.
(17) James Phillips, "After World Trade Center Bombing, U.S. Needs stronger Anti-Terrorism Policy," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 22 February 1995, 240, on-line, Internet, 12 September 2001, available fromhttp://www.heritage.org/librarycategories/natsec/bgu240.html.
(18) "Sentenced To Die," Online NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, 13 June 1997, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 September 2001, available from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law.
(19) "Deadly Explosion," Online NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, 19 April 1995, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 September 2001, available from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law.
(20) "September 11, 2001 victims," American Liberty Partnership, 2 February 2002, on-line, Internet, 5 February 2002, available from http://www.septemberl1victims.com.
(21) John Pike, "Administrative Support Unit Southwest Asia (ASU SWA) Manama, Bahrain," FAS Military Analysis Network, online, Internet, 12 September 2001, available from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/fac/port/manama.htm.
(22) "World Population," PBS, 12 September 2001, n.p., online, Internet, 12 September 2001, available from http://www.pbs.org/kqed/population_bomb/hope/worldp.html.
(23) "Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendation for the United States Department of Agriculture, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) Discussion Paper 2000-29, Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness (ESDP) Discussion Paper 2000-04 (Cambridge, Mass.: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 2000), 12.
(24) Mark Wheels, Agricultural Biowarfare & Bioterrorism: An Analytical Framework & Recommendations for the Fifth BTWC Review Conference, September 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 2 February 2002, available fromhttp://www.fas.org/bwc/agr/agwhole.htm.
(25) "The 'Hidden' Epidemic of Foot-and-Mouth Disease," News and Highlights--Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 29 May 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 September 2001, available fromhttp://www.fao.org/News/2001/010508-e.htm.
(26) Steve Goldstein, "U.S. Officials Awakening to Threat of Agroterror," Dallas Morning News, 27 June 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 12 September 2001, available fromhttp://www.dallasnews.com/national/0627nat4agroterror.htm
(27) Ibid.
(28) Ibid.
(29) "Chemical and Biological weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present," Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Chemical and Biological Weapons Resource Page), 4 September 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 25 January 2003, available from http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm.
(30) Rex R. Kiziah, Assessment of the Emerging Biocruise Threat, Future Warfare Series no. 6 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Counterproliferation Center, August 2000), n.p., on-line, Internet, 25 January 2003, available fromhttp://www.su.af.mil/au/awc.> COL (DR) JIM A. DAVIS, USAF*
* This article is based upon the author's esay 'A Biological Warfare Wake-Up Call: Prevalent Myths and Likely Scenarious," published as chapter 10 in The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm, 2d ed., ed. col (Dr) Jim A. Davis and Dr. Barry Schneider (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Counterproliferation Center, April 2002), 289-307, on-line, Internet, 21 January 2003, available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/biostorm/davis.doc.
Editorial Abstract: The several anthrax incidents that occurred in Florida, New York, and Washington, D.C., during the fall of 2001 did not provide convincing evidence that a mass-casualty biological warfare attack is likely. Colonel Dav is systematically unravels six prevailing myths that, in his view, blind US decision makers to the possibility of bioattacks against agriculture, troops, and population centers. In Davis' opinion, our persistent denial of the realities that characterize our adversaries' biological warfare capabilities could result in catastrophic consequences.
Col (Dr) Jim A, Davis (BS, DVM, Texas A&M University; MPH, DrPH, University of Texas) is a professor at the Air War College. specializing in chemical and biological warfare (CBW) issues, and the deputy director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center. He began his military service in the Army Veterinary Corps. and his four-year experience included dealing with defensive CBW. During a break in active military service and while serving in the US Army Reserves, Colonel Davis practiced veterinary medicine for six years before joining the USAF in 1987 as a public health officer. Prior to his current position, he served as the deputy chair. Department of Future Conflicts at Air War College, USAF Surgeon General's Chair to Air University, and commanded the 48th Aerospace Medicine Squadron at RAF Lakenheath, United Kingdom (UK). He also served as a UK medical intelligence officer and as a US Air Forces in Europe consultant for public health. His AF duties have included overseeing stored chemical agents, teaching emergency wartime medicine in surgical labs, leading decontamination teams, CBW briefings to city and state officials, research and publishing, assisting in exercises at all levels, and assisting Office of the Secretary of Defense and Central Command personnel in the international environment to mitigate the effects of weapons of mass destruction. He is board certified wits the American College of Veterinary Preventive Medicine and is a Foreign Animal Disease Diagaostician. Colonel Davis is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.
COPYRIGHT 2003 U.S. Air Force
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group
Col (Dr) Jim A. Davis "The looming biological warfare storm: misconceptions and probable scenarios". Air & Space Power Journal. FindArticles.com. 09 Nov, 2009.
___
original blog by Patrick Emek:
Simple Bioweapons Of The 21st Century
(Old Acquaintances Renewed!)
''Things Very Ancient and Very Familiar Come Knocking With Tidings Very Different From The Arrogance Your Politicians and Scientists Would Wish To Reassure You With'' [paraphrase] (P. Emek, 2014)
I
Dysentery
Dysentery
A question I was asked some time ago:
''People always talk about bioweapons but never give any examples I can understand.
Can you give me a common sense example that I can understand – without the hype please?''
(paraphrase)
Hiya! I am sorry but it is difficult to always use non-technical language as we are dealing with scientific items which have their own nomenclature. I didn't invent the nomenclature so I have to work with it (!) If I describe the scenario in too simplistic language it might miss the intended audience - and end up on Cartoon Network (!); financially, that would be great for someone – but not for the intended audience here. [PE]
I have chosen a bacterial agent which can be fatal and one where no requirement exists other than the right conditions for it to thrive.
I have added an external variant (imported lethal bioengineered strain of the same bacteria) only as a fictional (speculative) example. There are international conventions in place to prevent exactly this (lethal) uncontrolled 'manufacturing' or 'bioengineering' scenario for easily available bacteria and viruses anyone can get hold of worldwide.
But there are also international conventions in place to prevent wars from starting. The latter, we already know, happen, with little to no deference to the international agreements in place.
Dysentery
A mild to severe bowel infection causing diarrhoea containing blood and mucus.
Already, much to your surprise perhaps, dysentery already exists in Europe and The United States but the milder versions of Shingella bacteria are usually not reported to medical authorities as they occur as, for example, mild to moderate gastroenteritis (stomach upsets caused by either infected food or failure to observe proper hygiene (such as washing hands after using a toilet.)
The rarer form is Amoebic Dysentery and can be waterborne (vectorborne)
Symptoms:
Large amounts of blood and mucus in faeces of diarrhoea which will decrease in volume but not consistency or frequency over several days. It may cause blood poisoning, kidney and liver infection and failure, seizures, internal (intestinal) and external abscesses (boils) and ulcerations. Severe stomach pains, nausea and rectal pain.
In the undeveloped world between 15%-20% of cases are fatal. (WHO will suggest that this figure is grossly overestimated. I base my figure on the lack or absence of available resources of an impoverished family to have either money or access to proper medical care.)
Over more than a century a whole (highly lucrative) industry has developed around the supply of drugs (antibiotics) all of which mask the persistence of many of incipient and persistent bacterial and viral infections in the developed world.
Because of the over-use of antibiotics in the developed world, many such viruses and bacteria have now become resistant to existing antibiotics and have been re-classified as 'superbugs' .
Hypothetical Scenario
Did you know that the scanning devices at airports, ports and seaports cannot detect larvae (eggs) at a very early stage of development?
Apart from lacking the spectral ability, scanners are not configured for biochemical larvae and cannot differentiate biochemical matter naturally present on, say, clothes, from biochemical (lethally re-engineered) larvae in transit for less benevolent purposes?
They will have minimal to no heat signature and sub-micron identification can only be achieved after a very detailed 3-D scan of, say, one luggage bag. How many luggage bags pass through one port or airport every day?
For all the sophisticated devices in play at airports and ports, there are ways and means to simply render these systems of detection useless as protective devices. Such devices only work for so long as, say, for example, a State actor (for example) is not drawing down from it's (illegal under international conventions) bioweapons stockpile - useful for a task abroad - or on behalf of a 'third' party – a state or non-state entity – acting as a 'false flag.' Far-fetched? Right.
Security for the most part is all configured to identify normal smuggling and the more obvious chemical elements existing in the periodic table.
Besides, there is unlikely to be a single terrorist group in the Middle East, the Far East or in Europe who have the capabilities, determination or sophistication to go through with such a plot.
Far-fetched? Right. Correct?
[Even banning all fluids and all creams on all flights and sea transportation worldwide will not solve this problem]
I want to give a further example from a few years ago.
In parts of the world where it simply costs too much to invest in sophisticated bioterror scanning devices at airports, there are often staff trained to spot, say, someone who visibly appears to be unwell, has a fresh cut on his/her face etc., and to politely intervene to make an assessment of the situation as to his/her 'fitness' to travel. (In my opinion, this could be a far more effective tool than the Western tendency to 'rely' on technology to provide the answers.)
The bottom line is this: For all the sophisticated devices, a State, individual or group who/which is determined enough, will bypass with ease all the devices currently in place providing security at borders in order to effect a terror operation.
[As I said at the beginning, a biological agent by itself is nothing – in the sense that it's 'effects' will be limited to 15-20% of the population, at most.
A biological agent with a 'programed' (RNA) 'timer'* (even a down-scale crude one) is as lethal as a nuclear bomb.]
References:Wikipedia:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shigella_flexneri
extract 1
*When genes are transcribed, a part of the gene called the promoter region has the job of switching on the gene so that DNA will be copied into mRNA. The Einstein scientists found that the promoter regions of the SWI5 and CLB2 genes do something else as well: they recruit a protein called Dbf2p, which jumps onto mRNA molecules as they're being synthesized. ….....
"Our findings indicate that genes making proteins whose levels must be carefully controlled contain promoter regions that sentence their mRNA molecules to death even as the mRNA is being born," ….....
"Once you gain insight into the mechanisms controlling the cell cycle and cell division," he noted, "you can propose targeted therapies for regulating the uncontrolled cell division that characterizes cancer."
extract 2
Regulation of bacterial gene expression by small RNA (sRNA) molecules is an increasingly recognized phenomenon but one that is not yet fully understood. We show that the sRNA RyhB suppresses several virulence-associated phenotypes of Shigella dysenteriae, a causative agent of bacillary dysentery in humans.
[conversely, if we know the timer or promoter regions, such can also be programed to extend the life of mRNA molecules, like you program your central heating system with a manual or digital autonomous timer.]
''... Shigellosis is a disease limited to humans, and to non-human primates (NHP) to a lesser degree since the dose required to induce infection experimentally is considerably higher than that required for humans [5][6][7] . There is a lack of laboratory animal models that mimic some of the essential gastrointestinal characteristics seen in human shigellosis. ...
... There is a lack of laboratory animal models that mimic some of the essential gastrointestinal characteristics seen in human shigellosis. Consequently, studies of mechanisms of disease including identification and determination of the role of virulence attributes and the nature of the host response are based on observations made on primates 1,[5][6][7][8] . In addition, evaluation of the many vaccine candidates currently being developed, depend entirely on the use of NHP or human volunteers [9][10][11][12] . …''
It is always assumed that, as in the case of 'traditional' terror and insurgency entities, the objective is murdering innocent civilians or assassinating enemies. But what if events are not philosophically connected to any such groups in any way, shape or form? What if the objective is the massive economic disruption, panic and widespread chaos across countries and continents with any fatalities subsequently occurring simply incidental (casualties) to 'the mission' ?
What happens if nobody claims responsibility for the attack(s) and all the public are left with are 'wild' media speculation(s) – with the likely consequential impact on civil liberties and free movement in 'open' societies.
How long can any country's economy and health services sustain prolonged and sustained massive asymmetric non-synchronous attacks of a chemical or biological nature where it is not possible with any certainty to identify who let alone when or where the next 'terror' attack will take place?
What happens if no demands are made? No blackmail, no extortion, no political nor social 'manifesto' is received from any terrorist group? The attacks just start and end without any apparent motive?
As is well-known folks, generals are always planning to win the last war they fought in the next time 'round.
Traditional Treatment For Dysentery:
The past treatment involved ingesting fluids (clean water) without the need for any antibiotics.
Since a victims stools are highly contagious for several weeks, recommended past treatments are Ampicillin,Contrimaxozole for Shingellosis and Metronidazole for Amoebic dysentery.
Widely available OTC products for diarrhoea sold in supermarkets and pharmacies should not be used.
These products are not produced by 'Big Pharma' for such emergencies – and could do more harm than good to your body for these reasons.
Check out the websites cited here for the most up-to-date products for dysentery.
Images Below Assume Natural Vectorborne Infections and Disease Worldwide
The images above may be subject to copyright.
II
Plague
Caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis, carried amongst the rodent population by fleas.
This is the most easily transmissible as it infects cats, dogs, rabbits, squirrels and other household mammal pets.
A bite from an infected flea to a human will cause Bubonic plague. Infected hosts will spread this easily transmissible disease by any contact with a potential host as the variant biological co-traveller, Pneumonic plague.
Do not forget folks, all international safeguards were designed specifically to prevent exactly this scenario and, to date, for over half a century since World War II,they have successfully contained this potential menace – the singular one all bioterrorist experts secretly fear and, through unanimous informal agreement, never discuss in public forums.
As conventional terrorists are thwarted in achieving their (perhaps quite genuine?) political objectives, as totalitarian regimes are supported by a totalitarian superpower, as genuine political opposition is mercilessly crushed, insurgent groups may very well revise strategic thinking and take the fight to the heart of the 'evil empire.'
This is a bacteria anyone can produce anywhere in the world – in their kitchen, basement, 'man cave' 'woman cave' or in the garden shed.
For the vector, all you require are a few live fleas.
It's relative ease of production is yet another reason it is rarely discussed and, the experts assure, will remain safely hidden away through international non-proliferation agreements with zero threat to the developed world for the foreseeable future. [Let's hope they are right – or, that you are still alive for them to 'apologize' to you if they are wrong(!) ]
To increase it's virulence as a bioweapon, an assumption is made that
1. ''inserting plasmids, small bacterial DNA fragments, into the DNA of other bacteria in order to increase virulence or other pathogenic properties within the host bacteria
Please refer to the reference in my 2014 publication on Bioweapons and also add
- M. Ainscough, Next Generation Bioweapons: Genetic Engineering and Biowarfare (April 2002). Available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/biostorm/ainscough.pdf (28 December 2012) (extract only)3. or you can download a copy of Colonel Ainscough's Paper from here
For the mechanics, please refer to my earlier blog and to the reference section of the same.
Symptoms:
Swollen and tender lymph glands ('buboes') in the armpit(s), groin and neck. Fever chills (hot to cold), headache, swollen glands, continuous tiredness, breathing difficulty (similar to an oncoming heart attack and has the potential to be misdiagnosed if the other symptoms above are not seen as contiguous to the infection.) The coughing up of blood in sputum and within mucous should be the alert signal that this is an infectious disease.
Believe it or not Bubonic Plague has a relatively good survivability rate (some 40% of infected victims will survive) compared with it's co-terminus host traveler, Pneumonic Plague, which has a 100% mortality rate if not treated in the first 24 hours.
Traditional Treatment for Bubonic Plague
•Antibiotics (Consult 'CDC' and 'Contagion' for the latest up to date details in this case)
•Streptomycin
•Gentamycin
III
H5N1 (and it's Relatives!)
(images above may be subject to copyright)
Bird Flu and Other Viruses Which Have Already Crossed The Species Barrier But Have Not Yet Been Weaponized For Use By Terrorists
As a weapon of war, the most costly economic (to the economy of a country) contagious disease could very well be Bird Flu and it's related mammal viruses(shown above.)
It possesses all of the qualities for the most easily configurable manageable and plausibly deniable weapon of war by a State, a State-sponsored operator, or a false flag entity.
There are two variants, A and B.
Type A rarely affects humans.
A genetically engineered variant of type B has already been shown capable of jumping the species barrier:
In Hong Kong, 1997, the strain (or variant) H5N1 crossed the species barrier - from bird to human - for the first time in recent known recorded medical history.
Since 2003 H5N1 outbreaks in poultry have occurred in Korea, Japan, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia and China:
''H5N1, a virus that has crossed the species barrier (to humans) three times since 1997. H7 subtypes have infected humans and other animals. Direct transmission of an avian H7 virus to a human first occurred in 1996, and outbreaks in poultry have been followed by human outbreaks among those culling infected animals.''
Symptoms
Cough, sore throat, fever,aching muscle pains, eye infections, pneumonia, severe respiratory disorders – high risk of mortality to very young, very old and those with weak immune systems; abdominal pains.
For Avian flu and it's relatives, this is fatal to birds and mammals.
For humans, there is a 30% survival rate.
As I said in 2014, there are ways and means to bypass all security monitoring systems for this unique set of viruses. This increases their potential lethality and the likelihood that a pandemic
will happen when variants (either natural or designed) of these agents are formed or converge.
The Continual Mutating Influenza Virus
(The 'hype' (below) that there are only two 'variant strains' is highly misleading*. PE)
(image above may be subject to copyright.)
* for a more scientifically accurate assessment please visit:
http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2018/future-cure-common-cold/
I deliberately took issue with the above image - because it neatly leads into the final section of this blog - synthetic biology.
Back To The Future (!)
(read the Intro!)
I have tried to keep this blog as easy to read as possible with as few technical terms as necessary.
Keeping it together just short of Cartoon Network is not the easiest of tasks (!)
To appreciate synthetic anything having an elementary knowledge of chemistry, biology and physics is useful (!)
If you scroll down the right hand side of this page you will find some useful online videos about viruses, virology and bacteria, produced with the general readership in mind.
I chose the above as the last image because it illustrates a very important point - and not just to 'pick a fight' with it's creator.
Yes indeed there are two very distinct 'strains' of influenza A and B, But this masks the fact that worldwide there are an estimated 200 strains existing.
The strains mentioned are the ones scientists believe are the primary and secondary ones - in their professional opinion.
I want to demolish this smugness in a few lines.
Their arrogance is based on the fact that it is assumed that, for example, you will not come today literally from living and sleeping in a tent in, say Mongolia, with bovine creatures (housed indoors as much to keep the whole family warm as to sometimes protect the livestock from the elements or rustlers) and end up in a Cafe in central New York tomorrow. The fact that the cows, dogs and other pets living and sleeping in the tent had 'strains' of influenza - happily 'shared' with the host family, who over centuries, had developed the antibodies to protect them from what would otherwise be a pathogentic strain of the virus, and the family itself, has little contact with foreigners ever in their lives, provide all of the ripe conditions for a vector or host (carrier) who is quite well, to get on a plane at UlaanBaatar and fly the 18 hour connecting journey to NY.
This particular strain may very well have it's own unique aetiology.
So when scientists tell you ''I don't understand* .......''(sic. what I am saying here) you can pretty much take it how 'out of touch' they are - and why it is so dangerous to place so much faith and trust in their limited perspectives of how opportunistic viruses - such as rare influenza strains - will behave in urban environments of 10 to 12 million people. (And I am not even including the potential weaponization of the influenza virus from such strains as a part of this particular blog.)
Opportunistic viruses do not work within limited parameters of elite scientific fraternities. The 'best' are 'street wise' for survivability.
My main concern folks is that advice about the likelihood of a major pandemic is being given by scientists who have little experience of the real world and are 'fine tuning' their recommendations to comply with the objectives of 'political' support for future funding of specific projects - and by (deliberately) not telling their potential funders the whole truth.
This (above) may very well be one way a major influenza pandemic will begin.
(Be also assured, these same individuals who failed to give a full account of the potential for disaster, will be the first ones asked to 'sort out the problem'(!); a simple matter of the politicians and their advisers 'hanging together' - or 'hanging separately.'
(*Just to say I do know how such people live. I have shared their hospitality and the offer of a warm place to eat and rest for a few days in a single hut, where everyone - including the animals - lives.)
©Patrick Emek, January 2019
All of the above material may be used without prior permission for non-financial and educational purposes. Request that you give note to the author and any of the references cited above.
Synthetic Antibodies
[H5N1 Virus Plastic Antibody Based on Molecularly
Imprinted Polymers
Chak Sangma, Peter A. Lieberzeit, and Wannisa Sukjee]
pp381-388
[from the book: ''Synthetic Antibodies,Methods and Protocols'' Edited by Thomas Tiller
MorphoSys AG, Discovery Alliances & Technologies, Planegg, Germany
ISSN 1064-3745 ISSN 1940-6029 (electronic)
Methods in Molecular Biology
ISBN 978-1-4939-6855-8 ISBN 978-1-4939-6857-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4939-6857-2
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017933077]
Key words: Plastic antibody, H5N1 influenza virus, Molecularly imprinted polymers, Surface imprinting, H5N1 MIPs, Synthetic H5N1 antibody
Abstract
Normally, antibodies against influenza A have been prepared from viable virus or an engineered strain in certain hosts or cultured media. Two factors concerning antibody production are obvious. The obtaining antibody that is a kind of biomolecule has to be handled carefully, e.g., to be kept in a refrigerator.
Furthermore, when the virus strain is highly pathogenic, such as H5N1, antibody production has to be
done carefully in a high-level biosafety lab. Here, we show how to produce an antibody against H5N1 from a polymeric material using inactivated virus which can be conducted in a low-level biosafety lab. The process is based on imprinting the whole virus on a polymer surface to form molecularly imprinted polymers (MIPs). The MIPs show some properties of H5N1 antibody as they recognize H5N1 and have some important antibody activity. The H5N1 MIPs are not to be considered biomaterial, so they can be stored at room temperature and thus do not need any special care.
1 Introduction
Influenza A virus infects people worldwide every year as a seasoning flu. Occasionally, under some conditions it could become a pandemic outbreak [1, 2]. When an outbreak strain is highly pathogenic the disease can kill millions of people as it happened in 1918 from influenza A H1N1 [3–5]. Few years ago, influenza A H5N1 virus has spread mainly among poultry farms and wild birds
in Asia [6–8]. It was found that H5N1 is a very highly pathogenic strain and can infect humans, although human-to-human transmission is limited [9]. Nonetheless, people fear H5N1 could evolve
to become a human virus [10]. To prevent or minimize a casualty on such a global scale researchers have been working on this strain [11, 12]. Designing and making effective antibodies against H5N1
(“H5N1 antibody”) is among important topics in this research area. Better understanding in the production of H5N1 antibodyand the related knowledge would benefit other disciplines such as
virus diagnostics or vaccine production Owing to the high pathogenicity of the strain, conventional
procedures from direct cell culture to reverse engineering to make H5N1 antibody from viable virus have to be carried out in a high biosafety level laboratory [13]. Methods that can produce H5N1
antibody under less restricted laboratory conditions using inactivated virus are always attractive. Based on the functionality, we can consider an antibody against a corresponding pathogen as a mate-
rial that can recognize the pathogen and inhibits pathogen activity. According to this, molecularly imprinted polymers (MIPs), which are produced by imprinting an antigen on a polymer system, can
be regarded as the corresponding antibody to that antigen provided the MIPs have the required properties. To get such MIPs,imprinted cavities left on a polymer surface are expected to form by
self-organization of monomers induced by the antigen of interest during pre-polymerization. Here, we demonstrate how to produce MIPs as plastic antibody against H5N1. The copolymer system
from four types of monomers is optimized for inactivated virus imprinting as previously reported [14]. Preparation methods are bulk-imprinting suspension copolymerization to form polymer-
beads and surface imprinting by virus stamping to form thin-film plastic antibody. These materials can be applied as a platform for virus classification and virus-binding agent screening.
Fig. 1 A scheme showing how to make H5N1 MIPs by surface imprinting on a desired surface (in this case is
a QCM electrode). First, drop and spin at 1000 × g the pre-polymer gel on a surface we want to have the MIPs.
Then, drop and spin the H5N1 virus template on a clean glass slide. At the end, stamping the H5N1 virus template on the pre-polymer gel followed by UV-induced polymerization process
For the materials and methodology utilized please refer to the book:
Key to all the best scientific articles are the references.
I have highlighted (below) some from ''Synthetic Antibodies'' you might wish to follow-up {PE]
Synthetic Antibodies
[H5N1 Virus Plastic Antibody Based on Molecularly
Imprinted Polymers
Chak Sangma, Peter A. Lieberzeit, and Wannisa Sukjee]
1. Edwin DK (2006) Influenza pandemics of the 20th century. Emerg Infect Dis 12(1):9.
doi:10.3201/eid1201.051254
2. Beveridge WI (1991) The chronicle of influenza
epidemics. Hist Philos Life Sci 13(2):223–234
3. Jeffery T, David MM (2006) 1918 Influenza:
the mother of all pandemics. Emerg Infect Dis12(1):15. doi:10.3201/eid1201.050979
4. Taubenberger JK (2006) The origin and virulence of the 1918 “Spanish” influenza virus.
Proc Am Philos Soc 150(1):86–112
5. Watanabe T, Kawaoka Y (2011) Pathogenesis
of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus. PLoS
Pathog 7(1):e1001218. doi:10.1371/journal.
ppat.1001218
6. Kim H-R, Lee Y-J, Park C-K, Oem J-K, Lee
OS, Kang H-M, Choi J-G, Bae Y-C (2012)
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1)
outbreaks in wild birds and poultry, South
Korea. Emerg Infect Dis 18(3):480–483.
doi:10.3201/eid1803.111490
7. Eagles D, Siregar ES, Dung DH, Weaver J,
Wong F, Daniels P (2009) H5N1 highly
pathogenic avian influenza in Southeast Asia.
Rev Sci Tech 28(1):341–348
8. Gutiérrez RA, Naughtin MJ, Horm SV, San S,
Buchy P (2009) A(H5N1) virus evolution in
South East Asia. Viruses 1(3):335–361.
doi:10.3390/v1030335
9. Wang H, Feng Z, Shu Y, Yu H, Zhou L, Zu R,
Huai Y, Dong J, Bao C, Wen L, Wang H, Yang
P, Zhao W, Dong L, Zhou M, Liao Q, Yang
H, Wang M, Lu X, Shi Z, Wang W, Gu L, Zhu
F, Li Q, Yin W, Yang W, Li D, Uyeki TM,
Wang Y (2008) Probable limited person-to-
H5N1 Plastic Antibody
388
person transmission of highly pathogenic avian
influenza A (H5N1) virus in China. Lancet
371(9622):1427–1434. doi:10.1016/
S0140-6736(08)60493-6
10. Ungchusak K, Auewarakul P, Dowell SF,
Kitphati R, Auwanit W, Puthavathana P,
Uiprasertkul M, Boonnak K, Pittayawonganon
C, Cox NJ, Zaki SR, Thawatsupha P,
Chittaganpitch M, Khontong R, Simmerman
JM, Chunsutthiwat S (2005) Probable person-
to- person transmission of avian influenza A
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All the above from 'Synthetic Antibodies' to the references are extracted from the book:
''Synthetic Antibodies Methods and Protocols''Edited by Thomas Tiller
MorphoSys AG, Discovery Alliances & Technologies, Planegg, Germany
ISSN 1064-3745 ISSN 1940-6029 (electronic)
Methods in Molecular Biology
ISBN 978-1-4939-6855-8 ISBN 978-1-4939-6857-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4939-6857-2
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017933077
Reference:
https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781588291844
Assassinations, Murders, Accidental Deaths (by Messing With Intemperate Viruses, Bacteria - and Things In-Between!)
or
(Why)
A Career In Microbiology Can Be Harmful To Your Health
(Especially Since 9-11)
by
Michael Davidson
© Copyright 2002, From The Wilderness Publications, www.copvcia.com, All rights reserved. May be recopied, distributed for non-profit purposes only; May not be posted on an Internet web site without express written authorization. Contact service@copvcia.com for permission.
List of murdered scientists..
List of murdered scientists..
#!.dec. 2001.. Dr. David Schwartz.. murdered at home.. #2 Dr Benito Que... dead in the street...3 Dr.Set Van Nguyen..dead in airlock refrigerator. 4 DR.Don Wiley.. vanished.. car abandoned...5 Dr. Vladimer Pasechnik Dead near his home. ..... Feb. 2002...6 Dr. Ian Langford .Russian.. beaten to death in his home...7. DR. V Korshunov... Russian..head bashed in... 8 Dr A Bushlinski Russian.. murdered.. 9.. Dr. I Glebov.. Russian.. Bandit attack.... Also reported that in plane from Isreal to Russia 4 or 5 microbiologists were aboard.. The plane that crashed in the sea near Russia.. that was brought down by missle.. Their names not published.. (that I know of )....
What did these scientists know that was so important that they had to be silenced..????.
(OR, what CURE could they have come up with to what's about to be DELIBERATELY RELEASED??)
Missing / Dead Scientists
Another Leading Scientist Found Dead
Dr Ian Langford, Senior Research Associate in CSERGE, in the UK
British News
February 13, 2002
Mystery death of scientist
By Michael Horsnell
DETECTIVES were last night trying to unravel the circumstances in which a leading university research scientist was found dead at his blood-spattered and apparently ransacked home.
The body of Ian Langford, 40, a senior Fellow at the University of East Anglia’s Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment, was discovered on Monday night by police and ambulancemen. The body was naked from the waist down and partly wedged under a chair. It is understood that doors to the terraced house were locked.
A post-mortem examination failed to establish how Dr Langford, who lived alone in the house in Norwich, died.
Dr Langford began working at the university in 1993 after gaining his PhD in childhood leukaemia and infection following a first-class honours degree in environmental sciences. He worked most recently as a senior researcher assessing risk to the environment.
Professor Kerry Turner, director of the centre, said: “We are all very shocked by this appalling news. Ian was without doubt one of Europe’s leading experts on environmental risk, specialising in links between human health and environmental risk. He was known for his work on the effects on health of bathing water and air pollution, for example. He was one of the most brilliant colleagues I have ever had.”
http://nyc.indymedia.org/en/2002/02/11391.html
A Career In Microbiology Can Be Harmful To Your Health
Especially Since 9-11
by
Michael Davidson
© Copyright 2002, From The Wilderness Publications, www.copvcia.com, All rights reserved. May be recopied, distributed for non-profit purposes only; May not be posted on an Internet web site without express written authorization. Contact service@copvcia.com for permission.
[ -- As FTW has begun to investigate serious discussions by legitimate scientists and academics on the possible “necessity” of reducing the world¹s population by more than four billion people, no stranger set of circumstances since 9-11-01 adds credibility to this possibility than the suspicious deaths of what may be as many as 12 world-class microbiologists. Following on the heels of our two-part series on the coming world oil crisis, this story by Michael Davidson, FTW’s new staff writer, and a graduate of the Syracuse University School of Journalism, is one which takes on a unique significance. Special thanks to Jeff Rense, www.rense.com and researcher Ian Gurney for bringing five of these deaths to FTW¹s and the world¹s attention first. – Revised February 15, 2002 – In our original story we incorrectly reported the original date of disappearance of Dr. Don Wiley. That has been corrected in this version of the story. -- MCR]
----------------------
FTW - February 14, 2002 -- How many microbiologists does it take to change a light bulb?
Whatever you think the answer may be, change that light bulb soon.
Microbiologists are dropping like flies!
In the five-week period from November 16, 2001 through December 23, 2001, five world-class microbiologists in different parts of the world were reported dead. Four undoubtedly died of "unnatural" causes, while the fifth's death is quite questionable.
In the ten weeks prior to December 12, 2001, two additional microbiologists were killed, and possibly another five. The period also saw the deaths of three Israelis holding high-level positions in either medical research or public health.
On November 16, 2001, Dr. Don C. Wiley, 57, vanished, and his abandoned rental car was found on the Hernando de Soto Bridge outside Memphis, TN.
On December 10, 2001, Dr. David Schwartz, 57, was found murdered in his rural home in Loudon County, Virginia.
On December 12, 2001, Dr. Benito Que was found comatose in the street near the laboratory where he worked at the University of Miami Medical School.
On December 14, 2001, Set Van Nguyen was found dead in the airlock entrance to the walk-in refrigerator in the laboratory he worked at in Victoria State, Australia.
And on December 23, 2001, Dr. Vladimir Pasechnik, 64, was found dead in Wiltshire, England, a village near his home.
Before these deaths, on October 4, 2001, a commercial jetliner traveling from Israel to Novosibirsk, Siberia was shot down over the Black Sea by an "errant" Ukrainian surface-to-air missile, killing all on board. The missile was over 100 miles off-course. Despite early news stories reporting it as a charter, the flight (Air Sibir 1812) was a regularly scheduled flight.
According to several press reports, including a 12/05/01 article by Barry Chamish and one on 1/13/02 by Jim Rarey (both available at www.rense.com), the plane is believed by many in Israel to have had as many as four or five passengers who were microbiologists. Both Israel and Novosibirsk are homes for cutting-edge microbiological research. Novosibirsk is known as the scientific capital of Siberia. There are over 50 research facilities there, and 13 full universities for a population of only 2.5 million people.
At about the time of the Black Sea crash, Israeli journalists had been sounding the alarm that two Israeli microbiologists had been murdered, allegedly by terrorists. On November 24, 2001 a Swissair flight from Berlin to Zurich crashed on its landing approach. 24 of the 33 persons on board were killed, including the head of the Hematology department at Israel's Ichilov Hospital, as well as directors of the Tel Aviv Public Health Department and Hebrew University School of Medicine. They were the only Israelis on the flight. The names of those killed, as reported in a subsequent Israeli news story but not matched to their job titles, were Avishai Berkman, Amiramp Eldor and Yaacov Matzner.
Besides all being microbiologists, the five scientists who died within five weeks of each other pose severe problems with "official" explanations of their deaths. And four of the five were doing virtually identical research; research that has global political and financial significance.
A MEMPHIS MYSTERY
Dr. Don C. Wiley, of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute at Harvard University, was one of the most prominent microbiologists in the world. He had won many of the field's most prestigious awards, including the 1995 Albert Lasker Basic Medical Research Award for work that could make anti-viral vaccines a reality. He was heavily involved in research on DNA sequencing, and was last seen at around midnight on November 16, leaving the St. Jude's Children¹s Research Advisory Dinner at The Peabody Hotel in Memphis, TN. Associates attending the dinner said he showed no signs of intoxication, and no one has admitted to drinking with him.
His rented Mitsubishi Galant was found about four hours later, abandoned on a bridge across the Mississippi River, headed towards Arkansas. Keys were in the ignition, the gas tank full, but the hazard flashers had not been turned on. Wiley¹s body was found on December 20, snagged on a tree along the Mississippi River in Vidalia, LA, 300 miles south of Memphis. Until his body was found, Dr. Wiley's death was handled as a "missing person" case and police did no forensic examinations.
Early reports about Wiley's disappearance made no mention of paint marks on his car, or a missing hubcap which turned up in subsequent reports. The type of accident needed to knock off the hubcaps (actually a complete wheel
cover) used on recent model Galants would have caused marked damage to the sheet metal on either side of the wheel, and probably the wheel itself. No body or wheel damage to the car has been reported.
Wiley's car was found about a five minute drive from the hotel where he was last seen. There is a four-hour period in his evening that cannot be accounted for. There is also no explanation as to why he would have been headed into Arkansas late at night. Dr. Wiley was staying at his father¹s home in Memphis.
The Hernando de Soto Bridge carries Interstate 40 out of Memphis, across the Mississippi River into Arkansas. It was early Sunday morning (or late Saturday night depending on your point of view) in one of America's premier music and nightclub towns. The traffic on the bridge was reduced to a single lane in each direction. This would have caused all eastbound traffic out of Saturday-night Memphis to slow down and travel in one lane. Anything in the other two closed lanes would have been plainly obvious to every passing person. There are no known witnesses to Dr. Don Wiley stopping his car on the bridge.
On January 14, 2002 (almost two months later) Shelby County Medical Examiner O.C. Smith announced that his department had ruled Dr. Wiley's death to be "accidental"; the result of massive injuries suffered in a fall from the Hernando de Soto Bridge. Smith said there were paint marks on Wiley's rental car similar to the paint used on construction signs on the bridge, and that the car's right front hubcap was missing. There has been no report as to which construction signs Dr. Wiley hit. There is also no explanation as to why this evidence did not move the Memphis police to consider possibilities other than "missing person."
Mr. Smith theorizes that Wiley pulled over to the outermost lane of the bridge (that lane being closed at the time) to inspect the damage to his car. Smith's subsequent explanation for the fall requires several other things to have occurred simultaneously:
· Dr. Wiley had to have had one of the two or three seizures he has per year due to a rare seizure disorder known only to family and close friends, that seizure being brought on by use of alcohol earlier that evening;
· A passing truck creating a huge blast of wind, roadway bounce due to heavy traffic; and,
· Dr. Wiley had to be standing right at the edge of the guard rail which, because of Wiley's 6' 3" height, would have come only to his mid-thigh.
These conditions would have put Wiley¹s center of gravity above the rail, and the seizure would have caused him to lose balance as the truck created the bounce and blast, causing him to fall off the bridge.
Dr. Robert M. Schwartz was a founding member of the Virginia Biotechnology Association, and the Executive Director of Research and Development at Virginia's Center for Innovative Technology. He was extremely well respected in biophysics, and regarded as an authority on DNA sequencing. Co-workers became concerned when he didn't show up at his office, and he was later found dead at home. Loudon County Sheriff's officials said he was "apparently" stabbed. It has been theorized that Dr. Schwartz may have interrupted a burglary in progress. Nothing, however, has indicated that investigators found evidence of unauthorized entry, or anything missing. An adult and two teen-agers have been arrested in the case. The three are said to have a fascination with both swords and Satanism, and the murder may have been part of a ritual. The Loudon County Sheriff Criminal Investigation Division will not release any additional information on the case, which remains open.
Dr. Benito Que was found comatose on a street in Miami, FL. He had left his job at a research laboratory at the University of Miami Medical School, apparently heading for his Ford Explorer parked on NW 10th Ave. The Miami Herald, in its only story on Dr. Que, referred to the death as an "incident", and quoted Miami police as saying his death may have been the result of a mugging. Police made this statement despite saying there was a lack of visible trauma to Dr. Que's body. Among Dr. Que's friends and family there is firm belief that Dr. Que was attacked by four men, at least one of whom had a baseball bat. Dr. Que's death has now been officially ruled "natural", caused by cardiac arrest. Both the Dade County medical examiner and the Miami Police will not comment on the case, saying it is closed. The public relations office at the University of Miami Medical School says only that Dr. Que was a cell biologist, involved in oncology research in the hematology department.
Set Van Nguyen was found dead at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization's animal diseases facility in Geelong, Australia. He had worked there 15 years. In January, 2001, the magazine Nature published information that two scientists at this facility, using genetic manipulation and DNA sequencing, had created an incredibly virulent form of mousepox, a cousin of smallpox. The researchers were extremely concerned that if similar manipulation could be done to smallpox, a terrifying weapon could be unleashed.
According to Victoria Police, Nguyen died after entering a refrigerated storage facility. "He did not know the room was full of deadly gas which had leaked from a liquid nitrogen cooling system, Unable to breathe, Mr. Nguyen collapsed and died" says the official report.
Nitrogen is not a "deadly" gas, and is a part of the air. An extreme over-abundance of nitrogen in one's immediate atmosphere would gradually cause shortness of breath, lightheadedness, and fatigue; conditions a biologist would certainly recognize. Additionally, a nitrogen leak in a laboratory's refrigerator system sufficient to fill the room with nitrogen would set off gas system alarms, and would be so massive as to cause complete failure of the refrigeration system, causing the temperature to rise, also setting off alarms that every one of these systems is equipped with as a standard safety procedure.
A RUSSIAN, BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND OLD CORPSES
In 1989, Dr. Vladimir Pasechnik defected from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to Great Britain while on a trip to Paris. He had been the #1 scientist in the FSU's bioweapons program. On November 23, 2001, Pasechnik's death was reported in the New York Times as having occurred two days earlier.
The New York Times obituary indicated that the announcement of Pasechnik's death was made in the United States by Dr. Christopher Davis of Virginia, who stated that the cause of death was a stroke. Dr. Davis was the member of British intelligence who de-briefed Dr. Pasechnik at the time of his defection. Dr. Davis says he left the intelligence service in 1996. When asked why a former member of British intelligence would be the person announcing the death of Dr. Pasechnik to U.S. media, Dr. Davis replied that it had come about during a conversation with a reporter he had had a long relationship with. The reporter Davis named is not the author of the Times' obituary, and Dr. Davis declined to say which branch of British intelligence he served in. No reports of Pasechnik's death appeared in Britain for more than a month until December 29, 2001, when his obituary appeared in the London Telegraph. Doing a Google search on the Web for "Vladimir Pasechnik" brings up, among many, two links to that obituary in the London Telegraph.
Attempts to access either of those links resulted in "Page Not Found".
Vladimir Pasechnik spent the ten years after his defection working at the Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research at the UK Department of Health, Salisbury. On February 20, 2000, it was announced that, along with partner Caisey Harlingten, Dr. Pasechnik had formed a company called Regma Biotechnologies Ltd. Regma describes itself as "a new drug company working to provide powerful alternatives to antibiotics." Like three other microbiologists detailed in this article, Pasechnik was heavily involved in DNA sequencing research. During the anthrax panic of this past fall, Pasechnik offered his services to the British government to help in any way possible. Despite Regma having a public relations department that has released many items to the press over the past two years, the company has not announced the death of one of its two founders.
Early October saw reports that British scientists were planning to exhume the bodies of 10 London victims of the 1918 type-A flu epidemic. An October 8, 2001 report in The Independent said that the victims of ³the Spanish Flu² had been victims of ³the world¹s most deadly virus.² British scientists hope to uncover the genetic makeup of the virus, making it easier to combat. Professor John Oxford of London's Queen Mary's School of Medicine, the British government's flu adviser, acknowledges that the exhumations and subsequent studies will have to be done with extreme caution so the virus is not unleashed to cause another epidemic. The uncovering of a pathogen's genetic structure is the exact work Dr. Pasechnik was doing at Regma. Pasechnik died six weeks after the planned exhumations were announced. The need to exhume the bodies assumes no Type-A flu virus sample exists in any lab anywhere in the world.
ANTHRAX CURES AND THE RUSSIAN
Almost immediately at the outset of the anthrax scare, the Bush administration contracted with Bayer Pharmaceuticals for millions of doses of Cipro, an antibiotic to treat anthrax. This was done despite many in the medical community stating that there were several cheaper, better alternatives to Cipro, which has never been shown to be effective against inhaled anthrax. The Center for Disease Control's (CDC) own website states a preference for the antibiotic doxycycline over Cipro for inhalation anthrax. CDC expresses concerns that widespread Cipro use could cause other bacteria to become immune to antibiotics.
After three months of conflicting reports it is now official that the anthrax that has killed several Americans since October 5 is from US military sources connected to CIA research. The FBI has stated that only 10 people could have had access, yet at the same time they are reporting astounding security breaches at the biowarfare facility at Ft. Detrick, MD; breaches such as unauthorized nighttime experiments and lab specimens missing.
The militarized anthrax used by the United States was developed by William C. Patrick III, who holds five classified patents on the process. He has worked at both Ft. Detrick, and the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah. Patrick is now a private biowarfare consultant to the military and CIA. Patrick developed the process by which anthrax spores could be concentrated at the level of one trillion spores per gram. No other country has been able to get concentrations above 500 billion per gram. The anthrax that was sent around the eastern United States last fall was concentrated at one trillion spores per gram.
In recent years Patrick has worked with Kanatjan Alibekov. Now known by the Americanized "Ken Alibek", he defected to the U.S. in 1992. Before defecting, Alibek was the #2 man in the FSU's biowarfare program.
His boss was Dr. Vladimir Pasechnik.
A PATTERN?
The DNA sequencing work that the above microbiologists were doing is aimed at developing drugs that will fight pathogens based on the pathogen's genetic profile. The work is also aimed at eventually developing drugs that will work in cooperation with a person's genetic makeup. Theoretically, a drug could be developed for one specific person. That being the case, it's obvious that one could go down the ladder, and a drug could be developed to effectively treat a much broader class of people sharing a genetic marker. The entire process can also be turned around to develop a pathogen that will affect a broad class of people sharing a genetic marker. A broad class of people sharing a genetic marker could be a group such as a race, or people with brown eyes.
ANTHRAX
About 10 weeks before 9-11, in June, 2001, senior government officials gathered at Andrews Air Force Base for an extremely complex war game called Dark Winter. One Dark Winter scenario had several major media outlets receiving letters demanding the immediate removal of all U.S. military forces from Saudi Arabia and the waters of the Persian Gulf. The demand is backed by the threat of biological attacks using anthrax, smallpox and plague. Another part of the Dark Winter exercise involved a terrorist smallpox release in Oklahoma City infecting 300,000 people, killing a third in about three weeks. Analysis of the exercise concluded that dealing with the epidemic was impossible due to an inadequate vaccine supply.
In 1998, the BioPort Corporation was founded for the express purpose of buying the Michigan Biologic Products Institute from the State of Michigan. MBPI was the only firm in the U.S. making Anthrax vaccine, and their sole client was the U.S. government. Until recently, BioPort has not been able to deliver any vaccine due to continuous problems with the FDA in areas such as sterility, contamination, as well as improper procedures and record keeping.
BioPort now has on its Board of Directors Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. In October 1985 Crowe was appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He retired from that position in 1989 and was appointed US Ambassador to Britain. Admiral Crowe, a long-time member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was given ownership of 22.5% of BioPort's stock without investing any money. Crowe's role at the company was to facilitate cooperation and good relations with government agencies and to secure military contracts from the Department of Defense.
After four years of constant factory violations that prevented the vaccine from being shipped, on December 13, 2001 the FDA began re-inspecting the BioPort anthrax facility in Lansing, MI. On January 14, 2002 The FDA issued a full approval of the facility, and on January 31 BioPort got final approval to distribute their anthrax vaccine.
BioPort's anthrax vaccine is quite controversial, with a great deal of debate about both its safety and efficacy.
SMALLPOX
An October 17, 2001 story in USA Today reported that the US government wanted to order 300 million doses of smallpox vaccine. Apparently, that wish has been granted. On November 28, 2001 a British vaccine maker, Acambis, announced that it had received a $428 million contract to provide 155 million doses of smallpox vaccine to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This was Acambis' second contract. The company is already in the process of producing 54 million doses. The U.S. government has 15.4 million doses stockpiled, and HHS plans to dilute them five to one. The two contracts and the dilution program will bring the total HHS stockpile to 286 million doses.
Smallpox was officially declared eradicated by the World Health Organization in 1977, after treating the last known case in Merca, Somalia.
According to Steven Black, a director of the Kaiser Permanente Vaccine Study Center, vaccinating the entire U.S. population for smallpox will probably result in 600 to 1,000 deaths, and several thousand cases of encephalitis. Chief of the infectious disease department at Thomas Jefferson University Medical School, Roger Pomerantz, warns about the complete lack of knowledge about the reaction to the vaccine of people under the age of two or over 65. He also expressed great concern about the reaction of persons with weakened immune systems, such as those with transplants, people undergoing chemotherapy, and those with HIV/AIDS.
..........
............................
there's much much more!
Intermezzo
..................................
.................
If you're not already sick to death and want read the whole story of why, should you choose Microbiology, Virology or Bacteriology as a career, in any country on this planet, and then go on to excel in your chosen profession, and why you will need a 'real' insurance policy in the event of your unfortunate accidental demise, read on, if you dare. In addition, you might want to make sure your brother or sister (or a relative) is either in law enforcement (or a Mafia Boss!) to silently 'go after' (in retrospect) your 'unidentified' assassins: - should you fatally slip on a banana - or slippery bacteria or viruses or be bitten by plague-infested fleas - when getting out of or into bed.
If you really really have the stamina for it and want to disinter all 52/58 pages (depending on your medium of access) of data of this very detailed research by Michael Davidson (where even your mainstream media is too frightened at what it will find if its research 'connects 'all the dots' or 'dots the I's and crosses the T's' correctly)